Configure permissions - Claude Code Docs

Claude Code supports fine-grained permissions so that you can specify exactly what the agent is allowed to do and what it cannot. Permission settings can be checked into version control and distributed to all developers in your organization, as well as customized by individual developers.

Permission system

Claude Code uses a tiered permission system to balance power and safety:

Tool type	Example	Approval required	”Yes, don’t ask again” behavior
Read-only	File reads, Grep	No	N/A
Bash commands	Shell execution	Yes	Permanently per project directory and command
File modification	Edit/write files	Yes	Until session end

Manage permissions

You can view and manage Claude Code’s tool permissions with /permissions. This UI lists all permission rules and the settings.json file they are sourced from.

Allow rules let Claude Code use the specified tool without manual approval.
Ask rules prompt for confirmation whenever Claude Code tries to use the specified tool.
Deny rules prevent Claude Code from using the specified tool.

Rules are evaluated in order: deny -> ask -> allow. The first matching rule wins, so deny rules always take precedence.

Permission modes

Claude Code supports several permission modes that control how tools are approved. See Permission modes for when to use each one. Set the defaultMode in your settings files:

Mode	Description
`default`	Standard behavior: prompts for permission on first use of each tool
`acceptEdits`	Automatically accepts file edits and common filesystem commands (`mkdir`, `touch`, `mv`, `cp`, etc.) for paths in the working directory or `additionalDirectories`
`plan`	Plan Mode: Claude can analyze but not modify files or execute commands
`auto`	Auto-approves tool calls with background safety checks that verify actions align with your request. Currently a research preview
`dontAsk`	Auto-denies tools unless pre-approved via `/permissions` or `permissions.allow` rules
`bypassPermissions`	Skips permission prompts except for writes to protected directories (see warning below)

bypassPermissions mode skips permission prompts. Writes to .git, .claude, .vscode, .idea, and .husky directories still prompt for confirmation to prevent accidental corruption of repository state, editor configuration, and git hooks. Writes to .claude/commands, .claude/agents, and .claude/skills are exempt and do not prompt, because Claude routinely writes there when creating skills, subagents, and commands. Only use this mode in isolated environments like containers or VMs where Claude Code cannot cause damage. Administrators can prevent this mode by setting permissions.disableBypassPermissionsMode to "disable" in managed settings.

To prevent bypassPermissions or auto mode from being used, set permissions.disableBypassPermissionsMode or permissions.disableAutoMode to "disable" in any settings file. These are most useful in managed settings where they cannot be overridden.

Permission rule syntax

Permission rules follow the format Tool or Tool(specifier).

Match all uses of a tool

To match all uses of a tool, use just the tool name without parentheses:

Rule	Effect
`Bash`	Matches all Bash commands
`WebFetch`	Matches all web fetch requests
`Read`	Matches all file reads

Bash(*) is equivalent to Bash and matches all Bash commands.

Use specifiers for fine-grained control

Add a specifier in parentheses to match specific tool uses:

Rule	Effect
`Bash(npm run build)`	Matches the exact command `npm run build`
`Read(./.env)`	Matches reading the `.env` file in the current directory
`WebFetch(domain:example.com)`	Matches fetch requests to example.com

Wildcard patterns

Bash rules support glob patterns with *. Wildcards can appear at any position in the command. This configuration allows npm and git commit commands while blocking git push:

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "Bash(npm run *)",
      "Bash(git commit *)",
      "Bash(git * main)",
      "Bash(* --version)",
      "Bash(* --help *)"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "Bash(git push *)"
    ]
  }
}

The space before * matters: Bash(ls *) matches ls -la but not lsof, while Bash(ls*) matches both. The :* suffix is an equivalent way to write a trailing wildcard, so Bash(ls:*) matches the same commands as Bash(ls *). The permission dialog writes the space-separated form when you select “Yes, don’t ask again” for a command prefix. The :* form is only recognized at the end of a pattern. In a pattern like Bash(git:* push), the colon is treated as a literal character and won’t match git commands.

Tool-specific permission rules

Bash

Bash permission rules support wildcard matching with *. Wildcards can appear at any position in the command, including at the beginning, middle, or end:

Bash(npm run build) matches the exact Bash command npm run build
Bash(npm run test *) matches Bash commands starting with npm run test
Bash(npm *) matches any command starting with npm
Bash(* install) matches any command ending with install
Bash(git * main) matches commands like git checkout main and git log --oneline main

A single * matches any sequence of characters including spaces, so one wildcard can span multiple arguments. Bash(git *) matches git log --oneline --all, and Bash(git * main) matches git push origin main as well as git merge main. When * appears at the end with a space before it (like Bash(ls *)), it enforces a word boundary, requiring the prefix to be followed by a space or end-of-string. For example, Bash(ls *) matches ls -la but not lsof. In contrast, Bash(ls*) without a space matches both ls -la and lsof because there’s no word boundary constraint.

Compound commands

Claude Code is aware of shell operators, so a rule like Bash(safe-cmd *) won’t give it permission to run the command safe-cmd && other-cmd. The recognized command separators are &&, ||, ;, |, |&, &, and newlines. A rule must match each subcommand independently.

When you approve a compound command with “Yes, don’t ask again”, Claude Code saves a separate rule for each subcommand that requires approval, rather than a single rule for the full compound string. For example, approving git status && npm test saves a rule for npm test, so future npm test invocations are recognized regardless of what precedes the &&. Subcommands like cd into a subdirectory generate their own Read rule for that path. Up to 5 rules may be saved for a single compound command.

Process wrappers

Before matching Bash rules, Claude Code strips a fixed set of process wrappers so a rule like Bash(npm test *) also matches timeout 30 npm test. The recognized wrappers are timeout, time, nice, nohup, and stdbuf. Bare xargs is also stripped, so Bash(grep *) matches xargs grep pattern. Stripping applies only when xargs has no flags: an invocation like xargs -n1 grep pattern is matched as an xargs command, so rules written for the inner command do not cover it. This wrapper list is built in and is not configurable. Development environment runners such as direnv exec, devbox run, mise exec, npx, and docker exec are not in the list. Because these tools execute their arguments as a command, a rule like Bash(devbox run *) matches whatever comes after run, including devbox run rm -rf .. To approve work inside an environment runner, write a specific rule that includes both the runner and the inner command, such as Bash(devbox run npm test). Add one rule per inner command you want to allow. Exec wrappers such as watch, setsid, ionice, and flock always prompt and cannot be auto-approved by a prefix rule like Bash(watch *). The same applies to find with -exec or -delete: a Bash(find *) rule does not cover these forms. To approve a specific invocation, write an exact-match rule for the full command string.

Read-only commands

Claude Code recognizes a built-in set of Bash commands as read-only and runs them without a permission prompt in every mode. These include ls, cat, head, tail, grep, find, wc, diff, stat, du, cd, and read-only forms of git. The set is not configurable; to require a prompt for one of these commands, add an ask or deny rule for it. Unquoted glob patterns are permitted for commands whose every flag is read-only, so ls *.ts and wc -l src/*.py run without a prompt. Commands with write-capable or exec-capable flags, such as find, sort, sed, and git, still prompt when an unquoted glob is present because the glob could expand to a flag like -delete. A cd into a path inside your working directory or an additional directory is also read-only. A compound command like cd packages/api && ls runs without a prompt when each part qualifies on its own. Combining cd with git in one compound command always prompts, regardless of the target directory.

Bash permission patterns that try to constrain command arguments are fragile. For example, Bash(curl http://github.com/ *) intends to restrict curl to GitHub URLs, but won’t match variations like:

Options before URL: curl -X GET http://github.com/...
Different protocol: curl https://github.com/...
Redirects: curl -L http://bit.ly/xyz (redirects to github)
Variables: URL=http://github.com && curl $URL
Extra spaces: curl http://github.com

For more reliable URL filtering, consider:

Restrict Bash network tools: use deny rules to block curl, wget, and similar commands, then use the WebFetch tool with WebFetch(domain:github.com) permission for allowed domains
Use PreToolUse hooks: implement a hook that validates URLs in Bash commands and blocks disallowed domains
Instructing Claude Code about your allowed curl patterns via CLAUDE.md

Note that using WebFetch alone does not prevent network access. If Bash is allowed, Claude can still use curl, wget, or other tools to reach any URL.

Read and Edit

Edit rules apply to all built-in tools that edit files. Claude makes a best-effort attempt to apply Read rules to all built-in tools that read files like Grep and Glob.

Read and Edit deny rules apply to Claude’s built-in file tools, not to Bash subprocesses. A Read(./.env) deny rule blocks the Read tool but does not prevent cat .env in Bash. For OS-level enforcement that blocks all processes from accessing a path, enable the sandbox.

Read and Edit rules both follow the gitignore specification with four distinct pattern types:

Pattern	Meaning	Example	Matches
`//path`	Absolute path from filesystem root	`Read(//Users/alice/secrets/**)`	`/Users/alice/secrets/**`
`~/path`	Path from home directory	`Read(~/Documents/*.pdf)`	`/Users/alice/Documents/*.pdf`
`/path`	Path relative to project root	`Edit(/src/*/.ts)`	`<project root>/src/*/.ts`
`path` or `./path`	Path relative to current directory	`Read(*.env)`	`<cwd>/*.env`

A pattern like /Users/alice/file is NOT an absolute path. It’s relative to the project root. Use //Users/alice/file for absolute paths.

On Windows, paths are normalized to POSIX form before matching. C:\Users\alice becomes /c/Users/alice, so use //c/**/.env to match .env files anywhere on that drive. To match across all drives, use //**/.env. Examples:

Edit(/docs/**): edits in <project>/docs/ (NOT /docs/ and NOT <project>/.claude/docs/)
Read(~/.zshrc): reads your home directory’s .zshrc
Edit(//tmp/scratch.txt): edits the absolute path /tmp/scratch.txt
Read(src/**): reads from <current-directory>/src/

In gitignore patterns, * matches files in a single directory while ** matches recursively across directories. To allow all file access, use just the tool name without parentheses: Read, Edit, or Write.

When Claude accesses a symlink, permission rules check two paths: the symlink itself and the file it resolves to. Allow and deny rules treat that pair differently: allow rules fall back to prompting you, while deny rules block outright.

Allow rules: apply only when both the symlink path and its target match. A symlink inside an allowed directory that points outside it still prompts you.
Deny rules: apply when either the symlink path or its target matches. A symlink that points to a denied file is itself denied.

For example, with Read(./project/**) allowed and Read(~/.ssh/**) denied, a symlink at ./project/key pointing to ~/.ssh/id_rsa is blocked: the target fails the allow rule and matches the deny rule.

WebFetch

WebFetch(domain:example.com) matches fetch requests to example.com

MCP

mcp__puppeteer matches any tool provided by the puppeteer server (name configured in Claude Code)
mcp__puppeteer__* wildcard syntax that also matches all tools from the puppeteer server
mcp__puppeteer__puppeteer_navigate matches the puppeteer_navigate tool provided by the puppeteer server

Agent (subagents)

Use Agent(AgentName) rules to control which subagents Claude can use:

Agent(Explore) matches the Explore subagent
Agent(Plan) matches the Plan subagent
Agent(my-custom-agent) matches a custom subagent named my-custom-agent

Add these rules to the deny array in your settings or use the --disallowedTools CLI flag to disable specific agents. To disable the Explore agent:

{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": ["Agent(Explore)"]
  }
}

Extend permissions with hooks

Claude Code hooks provide a way to register custom shell commands to perform permission evaluation at runtime. When Claude Code makes a tool call, PreToolUse hooks run before the permission prompt. The hook output can deny the tool call, force a prompt, or skip the prompt to let the call proceed. Hook decisions do not bypass permission rules. Deny and ask rules are evaluated regardless of what a PreToolUse hook returns, so a matching deny rule blocks the call and a matching ask rule still prompts even when the hook returned "allow" or "ask". This preserves the deny-first precedence described in Manage permissions, including deny rules set in managed settings. A blocking hook also takes precedence over allow rules. A hook that exits with code 2 stops the tool call before permission rules are evaluated, so the block applies even when an allow rule would otherwise let the call proceed. To run all Bash commands without prompts except for a few you want blocked, add "Bash" to your allow list and register a PreToolUse hook that rejects those specific commands. See Block edits to protected files for a hook script you can adapt.

Working directories

By default, Claude has access to files in the directory where it was launched. You can extend this access:

During startup: use --add-dir <path> CLI argument
During session: use /add-dir command
Persistent configuration: add to additionalDirectories in settings files

Files in additional directories follow the same permission rules as the original working directory: they become readable without prompts, and file editing permissions follow the current permission mode.

Additional directories grant file access, not configuration

Adding a directory extends where Claude can read and edit files. It does not make that directory a full configuration root: most .claude/ configuration is not discovered from additional directories, though a few types are loaded as exceptions. The following configuration types are loaded from --add-dir directories:

Configuration	Loaded from `--add-dir`
Skills in `.claude/skills/`	Yes, with live reload
Plugin settings in `.claude/settings.json`	`enabledPlugins` and `extraKnownMarketplaces` only
CLAUDE.md files, `.claude/rules/`, and `CLAUDE.local.md`	Only when `CLAUDE_CODE_ADDITIONAL_DIRECTORIES_CLAUDE_MD=1` is set. `CLAUDE.local.md` additionally requires the `local` setting source, which is enabled by default

Everything else, including subagents, commands, output styles, hooks, and other settings, is discovered only from the current working directory and its parents, your user directory at ~/.claude/, and managed settings. To share that configuration across projects, use one of these approaches:

User-level configuration: place files in ~/.claude/agents/, ~/.claude/output-styles/, or ~/.claude/settings.json to make them available in every project
Plugins: package and distribute configuration as a plugin that teams can install
Launch from the config directory: run Claude Code from the directory containing the .claude/ configuration you want

How permissions interact with sandboxing

Permissions and sandboxing are complementary security layers:

Permissions control which tools Claude Code can use and which files or domains it can access. They apply to all tools (Bash, Read, Edit, WebFetch, MCP, and others).
Sandboxing provides OS-level enforcement that restricts the Bash tool’s filesystem and network access. It applies only to Bash commands and their child processes.

Use both for defense-in-depth:

Permission deny rules block Claude from even attempting to access restricted resources
Sandbox restrictions prevent Bash commands from reaching resources outside defined boundaries, even if a prompt injection bypasses Claude’s decision-making
Filesystem restrictions in the sandbox use Read and Edit deny rules, not separate sandbox configuration
Network restrictions combine WebFetch permission rules with the sandbox’s allowedDomains and deniedDomains lists

When sandboxing is enabled with autoAllowBashIfSandboxed: true, which is the default, sandboxed Bash commands run without prompting even if your permissions include ask: Bash(*). The sandbox boundary substitutes for the per-command prompt. See sandbox modes to change this behavior.

Managed settings

For organizations that need centralized control over Claude Code configuration, administrators can deploy managed settings that cannot be overridden by user or project settings. These policy settings follow the same format as regular settings files and can be delivered through MDM/OS-level policies, managed settings files, or server-managed settings. See settings files for delivery mechanisms and file locations.

Managed-only settings

The following settings are only read from managed settings. Placing them in user or project settings files has no effect.

Setting	Description
`allowedChannelPlugins`	Allowlist of channel plugins that may push messages. Replaces the default Anthropic allowlist when set. Requires `channelsEnabled: true`. See Restrict which channel plugins can run
`allowManagedHooksOnly`	When `true`, only managed hooks, SDK hooks, and hooks from plugins force-enabled in managed settings `enabledPlugins` are loaded. User, project, and all other plugin hooks are blocked
`allowManagedMcpServersOnly`	When `true`, only `allowedMcpServers` from managed settings are respected. `deniedMcpServers` still merges from all sources. See Managed MCP configuration
`allowManagedPermissionRulesOnly`	When `true`, prevents user and project settings from defining `allow`, `ask`, or `deny` permission rules. Only rules in managed settings apply
`blockedMarketplaces`	Blocklist of marketplace sources. Blocked sources are checked before downloading, so they never touch the filesystem. See managed marketplace restrictions
`channelsEnabled`	Allow channels for Team and Enterprise users. Unset or `false` blocks channel message delivery regardless of what users pass to `--channels`
`forceRemoteSettingsRefresh`	When `true`, blocks CLI startup until remote managed settings are freshly fetched and exits if the fetch fails. See fail-closed enforcement
`pluginTrustMessage`	Custom message appended to the plugin trust warning shown before installation
`sandbox.filesystem.allowManagedReadPathsOnly`	When `true`, only `filesystem.allowRead` paths from managed settings are respected. `denyRead` still merges from all sources
`sandbox.network.allowManagedDomainsOnly`	When `true`, only `allowedDomains` and `WebFetch(domain:...)` allow rules from managed settings are respected. Non-allowed domains are blocked automatically without prompting the user. Denied domains still merge from all sources
`strictKnownMarketplaces`	Controls which plugin marketplaces users can add. See managed marketplace restrictions

disableBypassPermissionsMode is typically placed in managed settings to enforce organizational policy, but it works from any scope. A user can set it in their own settings to lock themselves out of bypass mode.

Access to Remote Control and web sessions is not controlled by a managed settings key. On Team and Enterprise plans, an admin enables or disables these features in Claude Code admin settings.

Review auto mode denials

When auto mode denies a tool call, a notification appears and the denied action is recorded in /permissions under the Recently denied tab. Press r on a denied action to mark it for retry: when you exit the dialog, Claude Code sends a message telling the model it may retry that tool call and resumes the conversation. To react to denials programmatically, use the PermissionDenied hook.

Configure the auto mode classifier

Auto mode uses a classifier model to decide whether each action is safe to run without prompting. Out of the box it trusts only the working directory and, if present, the current repo’s remotes. Actions like pushing to your company’s source control org or writing to a team cloud bucket will be blocked as potential data exfiltration. The autoMode settings block lets you tell the classifier which infrastructure your organization trusts. The classifier reads autoMode from user settings, .claude/settings.local.json, and managed settings. It does not read from shared project settings in .claude/settings.json, because a checked-in repo could otherwise inject its own allow rules.

Scope	File	Use for
One developer	`~/.claude/settings.json`	Personal trusted infrastructure
One project, one developer	`.claude/settings.local.json`	Per-project trusted buckets or services, gitignored
Organization-wide	Managed settings	Trusted infrastructure enforced for all developers

Entries from each scope are combined. A developer can extend environment, allow, and soft_deny with personal entries but cannot remove entries that managed settings provide. Because allow rules act as exceptions to block rules inside the classifier, a developer-added allow entry can override an organization soft_deny entry: the combination is additive, not a hard policy boundary. If you need a rule that developers cannot work around, use permissions.deny in managed settings instead, which blocks actions before the classifier is consulted.

Define trusted infrastructure

For most organizations, autoMode.environment is the only field you need to set. It tells the classifier which repos, buckets, and domains are trusted, without touching the built-in block and allow rules. The classifier uses environment to decide what “external” means: any destination not listed is a potential exfiltration target.

{
  "autoMode": {
    "environment": [
      "Source control: github.example.com/acme-corp and all repos under it",
      "Trusted cloud buckets: s3://acme-build-artifacts, gs://acme-ml-datasets",
      "Trusted internal domains: *.corp.example.com, api.internal.example.com",
      "Key internal services: Jenkins at ci.example.com, Artifactory at artifacts.example.com"
    ]
  }
}

Entries are prose, not regex or tool patterns. The classifier reads them as natural-language rules. Write them the way you would describe your infrastructure to a new engineer. A thorough environment section covers:

Organization: your company name and what Claude Code is primarily used for, like software development, infrastructure automation, or data engineering
Source control: every GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket org your developers push to
Cloud providers and trusted buckets: bucket names or prefixes that Claude should be able to read from and write to
Trusted internal domains: hostnames for APIs, dashboards, and services inside your network, like *.internal.example.com
Key internal services: CI, artifact registries, internal package indexes, incident tooling
Additional context: regulated-industry constraints, multi-tenant infrastructure, or compliance requirements that affect what the classifier should treat as risky

A useful starting template: fill in the bracketed fields and remove any lines that don’t apply:

{
  "autoMode": {
    "environment": [
      "Organization: {COMPANY_NAME}. Primary use: {PRIMARY_USE_CASE, e.g. software development, infrastructure automation}",
      "Source control: {SOURCE_CONTROL, e.g. GitHub org github.example.com/acme-corp}",
      "Cloud provider(s): {CLOUD_PROVIDERS, e.g. AWS, GCP, Azure}",
      "Trusted cloud buckets: {TRUSTED_BUCKETS, e.g. s3://acme-builds, gs://acme-datasets}",
      "Trusted internal domains: {TRUSTED_DOMAINS, e.g. *.internal.example.com, api.example.com}",
      "Key internal services: {SERVICES, e.g. Jenkins at ci.example.com, Artifactory at artifacts.example.com}",
      "Additional context: {EXTRA, e.g. regulated industry, multi-tenant infrastructure, compliance requirements}"
    ]
  }
}

The more specific context you give, the better the classifier can distinguish routine internal operations from exfiltration attempts. You don’t need to fill everything in at once. A reasonable rollout: start with the defaults and add your source control org and key internal services, which resolves the most common false positives like pushing to your own repos. Add trusted domains and cloud buckets next. Fill the rest as blocks come up.

Override the block and allow rules

Two additional fields let you replace the classifier’s built-in rule lists: autoMode.soft_deny controls what gets blocked, and autoMode.allow controls which exceptions apply. Each is an array of prose descriptions, read as natural-language rules. Inside the classifier, the precedence is: soft_deny rules block first, then allow rules override as exceptions, then explicit user intent overrides both. If the user’s message directly and specifically describes the exact action Claude is about to take, the classifier allows it even if a soft_deny rule matches. General requests don’t count: asking Claude to “clean up the repo” does not authorize force-pushing, but asking Claude to “force-push this branch” does. To loosen: remove rules from soft_deny when the defaults block something your pipeline already guards against with PR review, CI, or staging environments, or add to allow when the classifier repeatedly flags a routine pattern the default exceptions don’t cover. To tighten: add to soft_deny for risks specific to your environment that the defaults miss, or remove from allow to hold a default exception to the block rules. In all cases, run claude auto-mode defaults to get the full default lists, then copy and edit: never start from an empty list.

{
  "autoMode": {
    "environment": [
      "Source control: github.example.com/acme-corp and all repos under it"
    ],
    "allow": [
      "Deploying to the staging namespace is allowed: staging is isolated from production and resets nightly",
      "Writing to s3://acme-scratch/ is allowed: ephemeral bucket with a 7-day lifecycle policy"
    ],
    "soft_deny": [
      "Never run database migrations outside the migrations CLI, even against dev databases",
      "Never modify files under infra/terraform/prod/: production infrastructure changes go through the review workflow",
      "...copy full default soft_deny list here first, then add your rules..."
    ]
  }
}

Setting allow or soft_deny replaces the entire default list for that section. If you set soft_deny with a single entry, every built-in block rule is discarded: force push, data exfiltration, curl | bash, production deploys, and all other default block rules become allowed. To customize safely, run claude auto-mode defaults to print the built-in rules, copy them into your settings file, then review each rule against your own pipeline and risk tolerance. Only remove rules for risks your infrastructure already mitigates.

The three sections are evaluated independently, so setting environment alone leaves the default allow and soft_deny lists intact.

Inspect the defaults and your effective config

Because setting allow or soft_deny replaces the defaults, start any customization by copying the full default lists. Three CLI subcommands help you inspect and validate:

claude auto-mode defaults  # the built-in environment, allow, and soft_deny rules
claude auto-mode config    # what the classifier actually uses: your settings where set, defaults otherwise
claude auto-mode critique  # get AI feedback on your custom allow and soft_deny rules

Save the output of claude auto-mode defaults to a file, edit the lists to match your policy, and paste the result into your settings file. After saving, run claude auto-mode config to confirm the effective rules are what you expect. If you’ve written custom rules, claude auto-mode critique reviews them and flags entries that are ambiguous, redundant, or likely to cause false positives.

Settings precedence

Permission rules follow the same settings precedence as all other Claude Code settings:

Managed settings: cannot be overridden by any other level, including command line arguments
Command line arguments: temporary session overrides
Local project settings (.claude/settings.local.json)
Shared project settings (.claude/settings.json)
User settings (~/.claude/settings.json)

If a tool is denied at any level, no other level can allow it. For example, a managed settings deny cannot be overridden by --allowedTools, and --disallowedTools can add restrictions beyond what managed settings define. If a permission is allowed in user settings but denied in project settings, the project setting takes precedence and the permission is blocked.

Example configurations

This repository includes starter settings configurations for common deployment scenarios. Use these as starting points and adjust them to fit your needs.

Configuration

​Permission system

​Manage permissions

​Permission modes

​Permission rule syntax

​Match all uses of a tool

​Use specifiers for fine-grained control

​Wildcard patterns

​Tool-specific permission rules

​Bash

​Compound commands

​Process wrappers

​Read-only commands

​Read and Edit

​WebFetch

​MCP

​Agent (subagents)

​Extend permissions with hooks

​Working directories

​Additional directories grant file access, not configuration

​How permissions interact with sandboxing

​Managed settings

​Managed-only settings

​Review auto mode denials

​Configure the auto mode classifier

​Define trusted infrastructure

​Override the block and allow rules

​Inspect the defaults and your effective config

​Settings precedence

​Example configurations

​See also

Permission system

Manage permissions

Permission modes

Permission rule syntax

Match all uses of a tool

Use specifiers for fine-grained control

Wildcard patterns

Tool-specific permission rules

Bash

Compound commands

Process wrappers

Read-only commands

Read and Edit

WebFetch

MCP

Agent (subagents)

Extend permissions with hooks

Working directories

Additional directories grant file access, not configuration

How permissions interact with sandboxing

Managed settings

Managed-only settings

Review auto mode denials

Configure the auto mode classifier

Define trusted infrastructure

Override the block and allow rules

Inspect the defaults and your effective config

Settings precedence

Example configurations

See also